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I. INTRODUCTION

In this, the era of the juiced athlete, asterisks, fallen heroes, and tell all books,
it seems all too familiar that the lead news story in the sporting section always
seems to be a new athlete involved in a new steroid scandal. 1 So here's to you
Justin Gatlin, Floyd Landis, Jose Canseco, Barry Bonds, Bill Romanowski, Shawne
Merriman, and of course, the greatest funk-bass-player-turned-alleged-steroid-

*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2007. B.A. University of the Pacific 1996.
I would like to thank Professor Jacquelyn Bridgeman for all her help and support during
the writing process. I would also like to thank Neil Komesar for taking time to answer my
initial questions.
' See Rob Sinclair, Barry Bonds Lacks Star Power, CBC SPORTS, April 1, 2005, at http://
www.cbc.ca/sports/columns/analysis/sinclair; Micheal Wilbon, Tarnished Records Deserve

an Asterisk, WASHINGTON

POST,

Dec. 4, 2004, at D10. See also Lance Williams, Mark

Fainaru-Wada, What Bonds Told the GrandJury, SAN
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007

FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,

Dec. 3, 2004,
1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 7 [2007], No. 1, Art. 6
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 7

mogul of all time, Victor Conte, Jr.2 He and his San Francisco-area BALCO (Bay
Area Laboratory Co-operative) laboratories not only diagnosed what was missing
from the nutritional end of athletic training, but would also allegedly supply
professional athletes that extra edge in the form of undetectable steroids opening
up the proverbial "can of worms" that Congress has tried to reseal. The arrest of
Conte signaled the end of America's blind eye.
In the summer of 2003, a then unnamed source delivered a syringe filled
with a substance, that was described as a designer steroid, to the United States
Anti-Doping Agency (USADA). 3 This designer steroid was tetrahydrogestrinone
(THG).4 THG was undetectable by current testing methods.I This same source,
later named as Trevor Graham, also said that many top athletes were using the
substance. 6 Now that the USADA had the syringe, the THG could be analyzed
and a test developed to detect it. I Dr. Don Catlin, of the Olympic Analytical
Laboratory at the University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA), developed a test
for the previously undetectable substance.' THG was eventually tracked back to
BALCO, a company based in Burlingame, California. According to its website,
the company provides "Scientific analysis of essential and toxic elements impacting the quality of life."9 Victor Conte, Jr. is the President and CEO of BALCO.
SNAC System, Inc., a nutritional supplement company operated out of BALCO's
office space.1 ° After the link to BALCO was made, the Internal Revenue Service
at Al; JosE CANSECO,

JUICED " WILD TIMES, RAMPANT 'RoIDS, SMASH HITS, AND

How

BASEBALL GOT BIG (2005); MARK FAINARU-WADA, LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS:

BARRY BONDS, BALCo AND THE STEROID SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

(2005).
v. Conte, No. CR04-004 SI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25896 (N.D.Cal. 2004). All of
these athletes have been linked to steroids. Id. Conte was a central figure in the production
and distribution of the designer steroid THG. Id. He was also the bass player for the
1970's funk band, Tower of Power. Id.
I See infra note 8. See also Beau Dure, BALCO Investigation Timeline, USATODAY.com
(June 22, 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/balco-timeline.htm.
' MedicineNet.com (2006) available at http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?
articlekey=24863 (defining THG: Tetrahydrogestrinone. A "designer steroid." THG first
surfaced in October 2003 with reports of its illicit use by athletes due to the fact that it
was undetectable at the time).
I Reuters, I Was THG Whistleblower, Admits Gatlin Coach, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 23,
2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200408/s 1182730.htm.
6
Id.
7 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, Mission Statement (2006), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/who/mission.html. The USADA is dedicated to preserving the well being
of Olympic Sport, the integrity of competition, and ensuring the health of athletes by
focusing on research, education testing and results management. Id.
8John T. Wendt, The Year ofthe Steroid: Are New TestingRegimens Enough?,ENTERTAINMENT
2 U.S.

AND SPORTS LAWYER, 8 (Winter 2005).

9Id. at8.
10
Id.
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criminal investigation unit and the San Mateo County Narcotics Task Force
raided the Burlingame lab.' 1 Conte, James Valente, Vice President of BALCO,
Greg Anderson, a well known personal trainer, and Remi Kochemny, a track and
field coach, were all charged with (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute anabolic steroids, (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States
through the introduction and delivery of misbranded drugs, and (3) possession
with intent to distribute human growth hormone; and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.1 2 In September 2004, the NFL fined only three players with
respect to the BALCO/THG scandal.' 3 Chris Cooper, Barret Robbins, and Dana
Stubblefield were fined three game checks each after the three current and former
Oakland Raiders tested positive for THG. 4 A fourth player, Bill Romanowski,
was reported to have tested positive but retired. 5 The four are the only positive
tests in the league for THG. The three active players were also warned that any
subsequent positive test would result in an eight-game suspension. 6
Until 2004, the NFL and all professional sports leagues were responsible for
policing their own players.' 7 These policies were bargained for as part of the league's
collective bargaining agreements with their player's unions. 8 With the proverbial
cat out of the bag and the seemingly endless litany of allegations of steroid abuse,
Congress decided to conduct hearings as to the prevalence of steroid use in sports.
Being that Major League Baseball (MLB) and Barry Bonds were at the center of
the BALCO allegations, Commissioner Bud Selig and Bonds took center stage
at hearings. Because of Selig's unwillingness to work with Congress to uncover
the truth, or to create any kind of performance enhancing drug testing program,
Congress began to threaten the autonomy of the leagues to police themselves.' 9
In 2005, in the wake of the MLB hearings and allegations of rampant steroid use in professional sports, the U.S. government decided that governmental
action was appropriate. Congressman Tom Davis of Virginia linked a Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention study to the steroid problem in professional
sports.20 The study stated that more than 500,000 high school students have tried
Id.

12U.S.

v. Conte, No. CR04-004 SI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25896 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
13Wendt, supra note 8, at 10.
14 See Dure, supra note 3.
15Id.
16 Id.
17 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Collective Bargaining Agreement (2006), available at

http://nflpa.org/CBA/CBAComplete.aspx. The NFL as well as all other non-Olympic
professional team sports have policed themselves from performance enhancing drugs. Id.
18 Id.
'"Associated Press, McCain: Law for All Sports Should be Considered,ESPN.com (March
20, 2005), availableat http://sports.espn.go.com/espn.
20 Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Rep. Tom Davis).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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steroids, nearly triple the number from ten years prior.2 He also quoted a second
study, conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the University of
Michigan in 2004, that "found over 40% of twelfth graders describe steroids as
'fairly easy' or 'very easy' to get, and the perception among high school students
that steroids are harmful has dropped from 71% in 1992 to 56% in 2004.22
In an effort to take action, Congress summoned all professional sports league
representatives to Washington for congressional hearings on the subject of steroid
use in sport.23 After the confrontational stance taken by MLB commissioner
Bud Selig, Senator John McCain said, "it seems to me that we ought to seriously consider ...a law that says all professional sports have a minimum level of
performance enhancing drug testing. On April 26, 2005, the Drug Free Sports
Act was introduced in Congress. 25 Essentially, this act takes the testing program
21 Id.
22

Id.

23

Dave Sheinin, Pro Sports Leagues Pitch SteroidProposalon Hill,WASHINGTON POST, May

19, 2005, at DOI.
Press, supra note 19.
25 109 H.R. 1862 (2005).
24Associated

[T]he Secretary [of State] shall issue regulations requiring profes-

sional sports associations operating in interstate commerce adopt and
enforce policies and procedures for testing athletes who participate
in their respective associations for the use of performance-enhancing
substances. Such policies and procedures shall, at minimum, include
the following:
(1) Timing and frequency of random testing. Each athlete shall be
tested a minimum of once each year that such athlete is participating in the activities organized by the professional sport association.
Tests shall be conducted at random throughout the entire year and
the athlete shall not be notified in advance of the test.
(2) Applicable substances. The Secretary shall, by rule, issue a list of
substances for which each athlete shall be tested. Such substances
shall be those that are(A) determined by the World Anti-Doping Agency to be prohibited substances; and

(B) determined by the Secretary to be performance-enhancing
substances for which testing is reasonable and practicable.
(A) Suspension.
(i) An athlete who tests positive shall be suspended from
participation in the professional sports association for a

minimum of 2 years.
(ii) An athlete who tests positive, having once previously
tested positive shall be permanently suspended from

participation in the professional sports association.
(B) Disclosure. The name of any athlete having a positive
test result shall be disclosed to the public.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6
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out of league hands and places it into the hands of the Secretary of Commerce and
the World Anti-Doping Agency.26 The policy stance taken by Congress is that the
youth of America look to athletes like Bonds, McGuire, and even Romanowski as
heroes and will act in a similar manner as these athletes. 27 In allowing steroids to
be used by the best athletes in the world, American youth only see the advantages
of having a long career in professional sports and do not acknowledge the harmful
28
physical and emotional effects of these powerful drugs.
In trying to resolve the problem of performance enhancing drugs in sports,
consideration must given to what institution is in the best position to create
policy. The NFL has been dealing with drug testing issues for close to twenty
years. Congress has been addressing the issue for approximately two years. So who
should decide how to address this issue? This article will focus on the NFus drug
testing policy because of the NFL's effort to eliminate performance enhancing
drugs over a prolonged period of time, and also because the NFL policy is the is
widely acclaimed to be the most complete program for team sports in the United
States.2 9 By using the NFL as the benchmark to compare policy, it will become
clear that a professional sports league can create a policy that works.3 0
This article will apply the institutional choice analysis developed by Neil
Komesar in his book ImperfectAlternatives: ChoosingInstitutions in Law, Economics,
andPublicPolicy, in order to determine which institution, Congress, the National
Football League, the market, or the courts, can best address the issue of performance enhancing drug testing programs for the NFL. The labor and employment
ramifications of this determination will affect employee and employer rights in
relation to performance enhancing drug testing programs that were bargained
for under the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. This article will analyze
the different institutions that could affect these rights and how to best resolve the
issue of which institution can best decide policy in the workplace of professional
athletics. Institutional choice is paramount in determining how institutions will
enact public policy.

26 Id. See also Shaun Assael, Dick Pound's FightAgainst Drugs Has Claimed a Surprising

Victim: Himself,ESPN MAGAZINE, 10 (July 31, 2006). The World Anti-Doping Agency
has been publicly scrutinized for its handling of the Lance Armstrong doping allegations,
and its chairman Dick Pound was likened to Captain Ahab "with his bearings lost, chasing
his great white whale." Id.
27 Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005).
28 Id.
29 See U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, supra note 7. The USADA oversees international sports
doping policy and works in concert with WADA policy. Id.
30 Wendt, supra note 8, at 8. Due to the fact the other leagues have only recently implemented policy, there would be little doubt that any policy created outside the vacuum of
the league, would likely be better than the untested policy recently created. Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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This article contains five sections that will outline and then apply Komesar's
institutional choice framework. Part II of this article will examine the evolution
of institutional choice as an evaluation tool. Then it will demonstrate what to
look for in an institutional choice analysis. In order to understand how this
theory applies to a real world situation, Part III will apply the institutional choice
framework to a similar factual situation, the banning of ephedrine, in order to
illustrate how the framework applies to the relevant institutions. The ephedrine
case study is particularly relevant because each of the possible institutions, the
NFL, Congress, and the courts made a decision in that case regarding the banning
of a performance enhancing drug.31 In Part IV, the article will use the information gathered in the ephedrine case study to apply Komesar's institutional choice
framework, to the NFL's performance enhancing drug testing policy. Through
this examination it becomes clear that the NFL is the best institution to decide
performance enhancing drug testing policy for its players/employees.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE FRAMEWORK
A. Background
Institutional choice or comparative institutional analysis refers to a mode of
public policy analysis that examines institutional choice as a central and necessary
component of public policy decision making.32 This type of economic analysis
is useful because the majority of economic analyses rely on economic efficiency
to guide the analyst to the best institutional choice for addressing a particular
33
issue.
Komesar's theory of institutional choice is rather groundbreaking, and
has called attention to defects in the market based efficiency analysis of other
studied economists. 34 Komesar attacks well-known legal scholars as suffering
31The lawmaking body involved in the ephedrine case study is actually the FDA, but since
regulatory agencies have the same effect as the legislative body, the results would mirror
each other.
32 NEIL KoMEsAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1994).

33 Id.

3 Id. at 34-44 (discussing JOHN RAwLEs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). See also id. at 17RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992)); Id.
at 198-215 (discussing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Id. at 235-44
(discussing RCHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985)); Id. at 217-21 (discussing Cass Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985)); Id. at 221-30 (discussing Bruce Ackerman, Beyond CaroleneProducts, 989 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985)); Id. at
22 n. 17 (discussing Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1098 (1972)); Id. at 137

22, 157-61 (discussing

n.13 (discussing

GUIDO CALABRISI,

A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982));

Id. At 215 N.37 (Discussing Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence Of Process-based
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6
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from the defect he calls "single institutionalism."35 As he explains, most institutional choice frameworks up to this point have only concentrated on single
institutions, ignoring other institutions that may or may not be more effective
in policy implementation.36 For example, Richard Posner, a renowned law and
economics scholar, opined that "where the market works, the courts allocate the
•. .balancing of costs and benefits[] to the market; where the market does not
work, the courts make the efficiency determination themselves."3 7 According to
Komesar, this analysis is incomplete.38 If the issue involves two institutions, the
market and the courts, then why does Posner only ask about variations in the
ability of the market? The question is not whether market performance improves
or deteriorates with larger numbers of parties, but rather whether the market
works better or worse than the courts.39 Komesar observes that the same factors
that cause market performance to deteriorate may also impede the functioning of
courts, making our choice between the two institutions much more difficult than
Posner recognizes.4 ° These gaps in Posner's framework are filled in by Komesar
through identifying the actions of the significant players within each institution,
and then comparing those actions across all relevant institutions.4' This is the crux
of Komesar's participation-centered approach to institutional choice.
In developing his theory, Komesar based his participation-centered research
42
on the work of two well known economists, Mancur Olson and Ronald Coase.
He stated,
Nothing is new or startling about the participation-centered
approach. Ronald Coase's transaction cost approach... emphasized the cost of information in understanding institutional
activity ....The emphasis on the distribution of stakes can be
traced to Mancur Olson's work on collective action. That this

Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980)); Id. at 179-80 (discussing Patricia

Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role ofGovernment in PrivateMarkets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517
(1984)); Id.at 180-81 (discussing Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor ProductsLiability Reform: A
TheoreticalSynthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 371-84 (1988)); Id. at 80 n.49 (discussing W. KIP
Viscusi,

REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY

11 Id. at 6.
36 KOMESAR,
37Id.at 22.
38

128 (1991)).

supra note 32, at 3.

Id.

3' David

A. Luigs, Administrative Law and Regulation: Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing
Institutiuons in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1559, 1566 (1995)
(reviewing NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw,
(1994)).
40 Id. (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 21-28).
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY,
4' KOMESAR,
42 Id.at 8.

supra note 32, at 4.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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analysis is simple and its components well known are major
advantages.., for my purposes. An analytical framework meant
to serve so vast a range of possible investigations ... must be as
simple, accessible, and intuitively sensible as possible.4 3
Olson's work on collective action describes the importance of the distribution of
stakes as the average per capita benefit derived from institutional participation
and the variance of this benefit across the population of beneficiaries.4 4 Coase's
work on the other hand, describes the costs of institutional participation, including transaction costs, litigation costs, and political participation costs, as the costs
of information and organization.4 5 Both of these ideas are central to Komesar's
46
framework and are virtually ignored in Posner's work.
Komesar's research sheds light on the gaps that can form when economic
efficiency is the only factor being considered. 47 Economic efficiency analysis assists
in determining the best policy making institution by weighing the costs against
the benefits that affect each individual actor within each institution.48 It also helps
flush out the potential problems that each institution faces in trying to determine
the efficiency, reach, and effectiveness of the final policy as implemented by each
49
of the potential participating institutions.
As this synopsis shows, Komesar accounts for more variables when analyzing
institutions than many of his predecessors. Because the central issue regarding the
NFL performance enhancing drug policy regards institutional choice in policy
implementation, Komesar's framework is beneficial because it can be used across
institutions. For that reason his framework will be the lens that this article will use
to determine the best institution for deciding drug testing policy for the NFL.
B. The Framework
Institutional choice analysis starts with the premise that one must decide who
decides. In 1960, Ronald Coase stated:
There is no reason to suppose that government regulation is
called for simply because the problem is not well handled by
[the politics] of the market or the firm. Satisfactory views on

43 Id.

(citing MANCUR OLSON, THE Locic OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)).
(citing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960)).
46 Id. See also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed. 1992).
17 Luigs, supra note 39, at 1562.
48 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 10-11.
4 Id. at 16.
44 Id.
41 Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6
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policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice,
the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects.50
In ImperfectAlternatives, Neil Komesar focuses on assessing the relative capacities of three alternative institutions available to address social needs: the market,
the political process, and the courts.5" It should be noted that this analysis does
not have to apply to only these three institutions, but in fact can be applied to
any institution that is in the position to set policy.52 Institutional choice analysis
begins with an assumption prevalent in law and economics." Specifically, both
individuals and institutions are assumed to be rational actors making choices that
maximize their self-interest.5 4 However, comparative institutional analysis also
provides both a positive and a normative structural approach to considerations of
legal change.55 As a positive matter, the analysis predicts the different outcomes
that will arise in various institutional settings based on the actors' incentives in
each setting.5 6 As a normative matter, comparative institutional analysis chooses
the best institution by determining the outcome that best furthers a particular
57
social policy goal.
Komesar's analysis consists of five steps. First, a policy goal must be chosen.58
Since the value of the Komesar framework is to analyze institutions' ability to
implement a policy, it is not important where the policy comes from so long as it
is not altered when comparing across institutions. Thus, virtually any policy goal

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
51See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 3.
52 See David Arsen & Courtney Bell, David Plank, Who Will Turn Around "Failing"
50

Schools? A Framework for Institutional Choice, Michigan State University Education
Policy Center (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.epc.msu.edu/publications/workpapers/failingschools.pdf (referring to intermediary institutions as decision makers and
thus qualifying them for this analysis); David Klooster, Institutional Choice, or a Process
ofStruggle?, Crossing Boundaries Conference, June 10-14, 1998. The 7th Conference of
the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver (citing land
resource management agencies as decision makers in forest preservation issues in Mexico
and thus qualifying for the framework). See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 10. The NFL as an
institution is relevant and should be included in the Komesar framework. Id.
53William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysisCritique,35
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 3 (2000).
54KOMESAR,

supra note 32, at 270-73.

51See generally KOMESAR, supra note 32.
56 NICHOLUS MERCURO, STEVEN

G. MEDEMA,

ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO

POST MODERNISM, 122-23 (1997).
57KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 28 (claiming

that both positive and normative legal analysis
requires comparative institutional analysis).
58Susan Freiwald, ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysisin Cyberspace: The CaseofIntermediary
Liabilityfor Defamation, 14 HARv. J. LAw & TECH. 569, 575-76 (2001).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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can be chosen. The second step is to identify the relevant institutions that could
implement that policy.59 Third, the relevant actors within each institution must
be identified. 60 Fourth, costs and benefits are weighed for each actor taking into
account forces that act upon those actors. 6' Fifth, the likely outcomes of each
62
institution are compared.
The central premise of Komesar's framework is that it is participationcentered. This approach relies on actions likely to be taken by relevant actors in
an institution. The participation-centered approach requires interested parties to
act in order to facilitate legal change. 63 Susan Freiwald sums up the participationcentered approach as follows:
The participation-centered approach involves positive analysis:
identification of the different groups interested in a particular
legal rule and of the costs and benefits to each group of participation in any of the three institutions. In order to focus on
comparative institutional analysis, the approach assumes a social
policy goal and then evaluates the comparative abilities of each
institution to achieve that social policy goal given the likely
participation level of each group. The approach also embodies
normative visions of what it means for each institution to func64
tion properly.
In other words, in applying institutional choice theory, the analyst must first
assume the social policy goal at the outset in order to use it to assess comparative
institutional performance. 65 The policy goal must remain constant so that a proper
analysis of the institutional competence of each institution involved can be made.
The reason why a policy goal must be determined at the onset of the analysis is
because it would be indeterminable which institutions could be involved and
relevant to the discussion. Once a goal is in place, the relevant institutions can be
identified followed by the relevant actors within that institution.
The relevant actors in an institution are people who generate legal change
through their activities in each institution, whether as litigants, voters and lobbyists, or consumers and producers.66 In order to compare institutions consistently,

59 Id.

60

Id.

61 Id.;

see also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 8.
Id.
63 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 579.
62

64

Id.

65

Id.

6 KOMESAR,

supra note 32, at 7.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6
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the participation-centered model focuses on the actions of those people. 67 There
are several ways that an actor can facilitate change within an institution. For
example, "concerned parties can put pressure on the legislature to make changes
by voting for politicians who share their views or by lobbying and attempting to
educate legislators and other voters with propaganda. '68 Also, people can create
change through the court system by bringing cases. 69 Finally, change can be made
7°
in the marketplace by transacting in ways that achieve it.
The differences in those actors' distribution of stakes in the outcome, costs of
information, and costs of organizing, leads to consistent differences in institutional
performance. 71 Participation will not occur unless the benefits of participation
outweigh the costs. 72 Freiwald stated "[t]he benefits from participating directly
relate to a party's stake in the outcome. ''73 In other words, the more the party
has at stake, the more that party is likely to facilitate change in a direction that
will benefit that party. Friewald also notes that "[o]n the other hand, the costs of
participation stem from the costs of acquiring information about the current legal
rule and the path towards change, as well as the costs of organization. '74 Freiwald
continues by saying:
Some characteristics of participation costs and benefits are true
across all institutions. In general, the more diffusely an interest
is spread over a group of people, the lower each person's stake in
the outcome and the more likely that small increases in the costs
of participation will inhibit any call for change to promote that
75
interest.
Costs of participation increase when the interest is complex because it takes orga76
nization, time, and energy to understand the relevant information.
67

Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577 (stating that the actors' collective willingness to partici-

pate in a given institution determines the institution's competence).
68Id. at 575-76 (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 63-64).
69 Id. at 576.
70Id. (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 98).
71Id.
72 Id. at 577 (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 125-28).
73Freiwald, supra note 58, at 576 n.2 4 . (Freiwald uses "stake" as a shorthand for what
Komesar discusses as either an impact from an injury or a stake in its prevention. Komesar
uses stakes and impacts interchangeably). See also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 161.
74See Freiwald, supra note 58, at 576 (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 8, 71). Komesar
breaks down participation costs more finely into "the complexity or difficulty of understanding the issue in question, the numbers of people on one side or the other of the
interest in question, and the formal barriers to access associated with institutional rules
and procedures"). KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 8, 71.
75Freiwald, supra note 58, at 576.
76 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577 (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32 at 68-75). Komesar's
analysis is dependant on interest group theory of public choice scholarship. See, e.g.,
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Institutions also create their own costs that affect whether the particular
institution will take account of all interests. For example, the adjudicative process,
with its formal rules and its limited scale, likely poses the highest cost to participation for a diffusely spread interest. 77 The costs of access to the political process can
also be significant if lobbyists are required to achieve the desired results. 78 Other
methods of participation in the political process are not as expensive, such as
informing the general public, including legislators, and voting for legislators with
sympathetic views. 79 However, the cost of acquiring the information to make an
informed decision may prevent those who want change from acting.8" Applying
these concepts to the real world, Freiwald states:
To apply the model in real world settings, the comparative
institutional analyst first chooses the social policy goal to be
promoted. Then, the analyst determines which groups would
be most affected by a legal change and considers how the
costs of participation inherent in each institution compare
with the expected benefits of using the institution. Under the
participation-centered approach, actors'collective willingness to
participate in a given institution determines that institution's
competence.81
In addition to weighing the costs and benefits to the individual actors within
an institution, other dynamics threaten to skew outcomes in the market, the
political process, as well as the courts in many instances.82 Freiwald stated that
"[The political process] represents a poor institutional choice when it is subject
to the over-representation of one group and the under-representation of another.
When one group has concentrated and high-stakes interests as compared to its
opponents, Congress will be subject to a distorting minoritarian bias."8 3 Generally,
& FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, at 12-37 (1991) (reviewing literature and
insights of interest group theory); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justifj
FABER

More IntrusiveJudicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-43 (1991);

MANCUR OLSEN, THE

LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GOODS,

(1971) (laying

out the foundation for the approach).
77 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 125-28.
78 Id.
79 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577.
80 KOME AR, supra note 32, at 91.
81Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577.
82 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 153-52 (comparing dynamics affecting choice and likely
outcomes in court, market, and political processes).
83 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 578 (citing KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 56, 76, 173, 192).
Under Komesar's model, minoritarian bias does not always lead to distorted legislation. It
depends on whether there is a countervailing majoritarian bias. Id. See also KOMESAR, supra
note 32, at 65-67. Komesar refines the interest group theory by devising a "two-force"
model, in which both minorities and majorities can exercise improper sway. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6

12

Shapiro: Who Decides: Institutional Choice in Determining a Performance En

2007

COMMENT

a minoritarian bias occurs when a group with small numbers has a high stake in
the outcome of the policy decision and also has the financing to get the attention
of the policy makers.84 Policy makers will hear more from the minority and will
likely not hear as much concerning the needs of the group with the diffuse interests, which may in fact be the majority of those affected by the policy decision.85
According to the participation-centered approach, one must evaluate whether one
group has disproportionate influence with reference to the social policy goal. 6
This is conducted by evaluating whether a group's influence leads to a law that
87
grants it more benefits than are efficient for society.
The participation-centered approach assesses court performance in a similar
manner, weighing the costs with the benefits conferred. The courts operate well
for the purposes of creating legal change only if parties actually bring suit. If
courts are selected as the institution to decide the question, the legal rule may fail
to change as needed, or it may be decided on the basis of the one case that are
brought.88 It is difficult for a court to create policy in a vacuum and the parties
to the suit must present the question to the court in a way that can affect policy.
For instance, if a party elects for a bench trial instead of a jury trial it is possible that the most relevant actor would be the judge in determining policy.89 If a
determination hinges on particular facts, then the jury may be the most relevant
actor in determining policy.9° Therefore, the parties that bring the case have the
most at stake and are the most likely to affect how the policy is implemented due
to the decisions that they make when presenting the case. If one of the parties is
a government agency of the government itself, then all the forces that affect the
political process are also at work in the courts.
Finally, when assessing market performance, transaction costs are the determinative factor. 91 When transaction costs take away the gains from contracting,
the market will not be well suited to make a legal change.92 As Friewald stated,
"Instead, transactions that are favorable in terms of their ability to further the
84

KOMESAR,

supra note 32, at 91.

85 Id. at 65-67.
86 Id.

87 See id.
A hypothetical example of this kind of evaluation would be if the assumed policy
goal was to stop minors from using tobacco products and the federal regulation was to

incarcerate all minors found using tobacco products. Although this is an extreme example,
it is obvious that the costs to society for incarceration and the burden on the courts and
police, is too high for this to be an acceptable solution. Therefore society would have to
bear the burden of the minority view, which in this case would be tobacco sellers who
would be in favor of more lenient sanctions. Id.
88 Freiwald, Supra note 58, at 579.
89 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 124.
90 Id.
91

92

supra note 32, at 121.
at 111-12, 171.

KOMESAR,
Id.
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social policy goal will be avoided. Under the participation-centered approach,
market competence requires transactions to take place, and it seems to require also
that contracts reflect real bargaining by informed parties.""
The Komesar framework can be a valuable tool in comparing institutional
choices for a given policy goal. However, the framework analysis is specific to
a given situation. The next section will apply Komesar's participation-centered
approach of institutional choice to the ephedrine case study. This case study illustrates how the Komesar framework actually can predict outcomes since each of
the relevant institutions made decisions to implement policy in regards to banning
ephedrine. The institutions implicated in the ephedrine situation, the NFL, the
political processes, and the courts engaged in efforts to implement performance
enhancing drug policy for the NFL. This case study gives credence to Komesar's
work as an indicator of institutional action, as it describes the acts of the relevant
institutions and the decisions they made in regard to ephedrine and shows that
the institution which would theoretically be best under Komesar's framework was
in fact the best in real life.
III. EPHEDRINE CASE STUDY
Before conducting an institutional choice analysis regarding performance
enhancing drug programs in the NFL, this article will first examine a similar scenario that has already played itself out in the NFL, the political process, the market,
and the courts. The application of the participation-centered approach to the facts
of this particular case will assist in forecasting how each institution might react to
the question of how to best implement policy for performance enhancing drugs. It
will also provide evidence that the Komesar framework is a tool that could be used
to determine who is in fact the best decision maker in this particular scenario. By
comparing the theoretical and actual outcomes for each institution, one can see
that institutional choice theory is a good indicator of how these institutions actually function to affect social change. Thus, an accurate forecast can be made of
how these institutions, under similar circumstances, would respond to the policy
of drug testing for professional athletes, in particularly changes in policy for the
NFL.
As stated, the first step in Komesar's institutional choice analysis is to define
the public policy goal. 94 After the goal is identified, an analyst can then identify the
institution. 95 Third, the analyst must identify the actors within that institution and
perform a cost/benefit analysis in order to determine the forces that will affect that

91Freiwald, supra note 35, at 578 (citing KOMEsAR, supra note 32, at 116-21) (describing

misled consumers with relatively low stakes as victims of market rent-seeking).
94Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577.
95Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6
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actor's decision.96 Finally, those forces acting upon the actor within a given institution that will affect the ultimate decision of the institution regarding the policy at
issue must be illustrated.97 In this section the institutional choice framework will be
applied to each institution-the political process, the courts, the market, and the
NFL-and will provide insight into how these institutions have approached the
issue of banning ephedrine.
A. Introduction
Ephedrine is defined as:
A common ingredient in herbal dietary supplements used for
weight loss. Ephedrine can slightly suppress your appetite, but
no studies have shown it to be effective in weight loss. Ephedrine
is the main active ingredient of ephedra. Ephedra is also known
as Ma Huang, not ephedrine. High doses of ephedra can cause
very fast heartbeat, high blood pressure, irregular heart beats,
stroke, vomiting, psychoses and even death.9
In the summer of 2001, Minnesota Vikings offensive lineman, Kory Stringer,
died of heatstroke during training camp.9 9 It was later discovered that Stringer
had taken the supplement Ripped Fuel, which is an ephedrine product.100
Ephedrine was not a banned substance at the time of Stringer's death. Former
NFL Commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, stated at that time that ephedrine would be
added to the NFL's banned substances list:
Manufactures can market so-called "dietary supplements"
without any prior governmental review for safety, efficacy or
purity. In other words, there is no way to be certain that these
types of products are safe and effective or that they contain
the exact ingredients listed on their label . . . . One example
is the proliferation of products containing ephedrine ....
Last December, players and clubs were alerted to the risks of
ephedrine in a notice from Dr. John Lombardo-NFL Advisor
on Anabolic Steroids. He advised that, particularly with regard

96

Id.

97

Id.

46
/
98 WebMD.com (Nov. 22, 2006), availableat http://my.webmd.com/content/article/

2731_1672.
Mealey's Litig. Rep. Ephedra & PPA 5 (2003).
1-8 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Ephedra & PPA 11 (2001).

99 MEIAv's LITIGATION REPORT, 2-12

100

MEALY'S LITIGATION UPORT,

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 7 [2007], No. 1, Art. 6
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 7

to athletes, there is growing evidence linking ephedrine to fatal
heart rhythm difficulties, strokes, thermo-regulatory problem
...and other serious conditions. 1
The relevant institutions here are the NFL, the market, the political process, and
the courts. Since the first step in the analysis is to assume a policy goal, it will be
assumed that the social policy goal is to eliminate ephedrine from the market due
to its adverse health effects. Accordingly, assume that the public policy is consumer
safety.

B. NFL Analysis
In a matter where death is a possible side effect, institutional efficiency is of
utmost concern. In order to begin an institutional choice analysis, one must first
0 2
consider the assumed social policy goal and actors in the market.1
The second step is to identify the actors within the institution. 0 3 The actors
that will facilitate legal change are the labor union representatives of the NFL
Players Association (NFLPA), the players themselves, and the NFL Management
Council.'0 4 Komesar referred to labor/management relations as a "little government" in that labor and management have the delegated responsibility to represent
the best interests of either the ownership groups or the players.0 5 For the purposes
of this discussion it can be assumed that biases are not relevant in the negotiation process between owners and players because the groups are to small to be
influenced by factors outside the scope of representation for both the owners and
players and are therefore the only relevant actors. 0 6 The result that would come
from negotiating impacts the league as a whole as well as public perception. The
goals of labor and management can be looked at like interest groups in the decision making process. 0 7 Consumers could choose not to watch the NFL if they
do not change the status of ephedrine. It could be argued that the league is really
only protecting players and the idea of the league policing itself is akin to the fox
1o NFL

General CounselAdolpho Birch Speaks on the NFL's Drug Policy, 5 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRc. 6, 10 (Winter 2002) (interview with Adolpho Birch, Counsel for NFL Labor
Relations).
102 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 597. "To consider Institutional choice in depth,
one must
simplify the public policy goal discussion by assuming the goal rather than providing
detailed proof." Id.
1"3Id. at 577.
104Telephone Interview with Neil Komesar, (Aug. 25, 2005). See also KOMESAR, supra note
32, at 10.
105Telephone Interview with Neil Komesar, (Aug. 25, 2005).
106
Id.The NFLPA and the Owners are in agreement on the banning of ephedrine because
it protects the integrity of the game. According to Komesar, since both the union and
management
are in agreement, bias does not come into play. Id.
07
1

Id.
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guarding the hen house. NFL General Counsel Adolpho Birch scoffs at this by
pointing out the fact that generally where there are criminal violations involved,
the player will face league discipline as well as whatever discipline he receives from
the court. °8 He argues that the testing program is in the best interest of the game
which is the reason for the policy to begin with. According to Birch, the integrity
of the game is more important than protecting the league and its players from
scrutiny.109 Therefore the only relevant actors within the NFL are the union and
the Management Council.
In the third step, the evaluator must examine the costs versus the benefits
with the assumption that all actors will act in a way that is most beneficial to the
particular actor.110 In assessing costs for the NFL, the evaluator must examine
transactional costs and the cost of information."' Information costs for the NFL
in this situation are comparatively low considering that several transactions have
already occurred." 2 Basically, the evaluation of different substances is ongoing.
Drug evaluation is not intended simply to identify ephedrine as a possible unsafe
substance. The transactions that have occurred in an ongoing basis have lead
to the conclusion that ephedrine was dangerous without that exact intent. The
fact that the NFL consistently keeps track of research and continues to actively
endeavor to examine performance enhancing drugs, demonstrates the efficiency
with which the NFL can disseminate the information since they already have it on
hand.113 Since drug evaluation is an ongoing process, the information is received
and examined quickly because all actors who could participate in legal change
for the NFL (NFLPA and the Management Council) have a background and
understanding of the potential ramifications of performance enhancing drugs.
Therefore, they can make concise, educated decisions on actions that would be
required to produce the desired social goal. In this case study, the NFL, through
its normal process of research and education, already had the information necessary to make a decision at the time of Stringer's death.1 4 Accordingly, the cost of
information in this particular case study was built-in to the cost of doing business.
Therefore, the cost of research for this particular purpose was very low because no

NFL General CounselAdolpho Birch Speaks on the NFL's Drug Policy, 5 V~AD. J. ENT.
L. & PRc. 6, 7 (Winter 2002). Use of illegal steroids, or, for example, driving while
intoxicated can have criminal sanctions, as well as league sanctions. Id.
108

109 Id.

0Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577.
Id. See also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 10.
112 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 98-100.
"3 Paul Tagliabue, What the N.EL. Is Doing to Stamp Out SteroidAbuse, NEW YORK TIMES
Feb. 29, 2004, at 10. See also Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R.
Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Gene Upshaw, President of the
NFL Players Association).
114 Id.
11
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new expenditures needed to be made in order to find out the adverse health risks
1 15
involved with ephedrine use.
The transactional cost of this decision could potentially be much higher. The
legal costs of labor negotiations between the NFLPA and the NFL Management
Council to agree on the status of ephedrine as a banned substance under the
collectively bargained performance enhancing drug program, and the drafting of
the amended policy could be expensive, but in this instance, not cost prohibitive
because protecting players' lives is in the best interest of both parties. The benefit
to the players, whom the union represents, of not dying greatly outweighs the
associated costs. Additionally, since the policy goal is one of consumer safety, the
fact that a well-known entity such as the NFL would ban the substance because
of the adverse health risk may help to regulate the consumer market for this
product. The consumers of professional sports, who may have been inclined to
use this product, will see that a respected organization such as the NFL banned
the supplement, it may cause the consumer to conclude the substance is not safe
and to subsequently stop buying the product.
Last, the examiner would need to evaluate who has the greatest stakes in
the outcome of the decision and what the benefits would be. 1 16 The actors most
affected by the decision would be the players through the actions of the NFLPA.
Management will also be affected because if another player dies at practice, or
for that matter on Monday Night Football, the public relations backlash could
potentially cost more than it would to simply add this product to the banned
substance list.117 There are several benefits to the players and the owners. The
players get a level playing field where one does not have to worry about competing
with chemically altered athletes, and the risks that accompany the use of these
substances. The owners receive the benefit of reduced risk of injury to players, and
the negative attention that goes along with "roid rage." It could be argued that the
players do indeed receive benefits from the use of performance enhancing drugs
in the form of lucrative contracts and longer playing careers. If an analyst were
to apply the Nash equilibrium in the form of the famous "Prisoner's Dilemma"
example to this problem, it would become obvious that the player has a great
incentive to cheat by using performance enhancing drugs and a minimal chance
of being caught.118 What this doesn't take into account is the concept of repeated
115Freiwald, supra note 58, at 576-77. See also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 68-75 (stating

that technical issues are difficult to deal with because of research costs).
116 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577.
117 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 98-100 (stating potential losses could corn from public
relations transactional costs since they are costs associated with doing business.).
H8 Roger A. McCain, Game Theory:An IntroductorySketch, THE DR. WILLIAM KING SERVER,
available at http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/nash.html. The Nash
Equilibrium Defined: If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can
benefit by changing her strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/6
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play. 19 If testing is ongoing, then players will likely not cheat because it is in their
best interest. 120 In this case, testing is ongoing.
The NFL appears to be an efficient institution that will act in the best interests of the players and the owners. It is clear that the relevant actors, the NFLPA
and the Management Council, would incur more benefits than costs associated
with the banning of ephedrine from the league. It is good for the business of both
parties to protect the players from taking this substance and it also protects the
owners from liability concerning ephedrine. Although the policy may not be far
reaching, it could have an effect on the market by affecting consumers of this
product in furtherance of the goal to ban ephedrine. Next, the discussion turns
to how the market generally could affect the status of ephedrine as a nutritional
supplement for the purpose of consumer safety.

then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash Equilibrium.
This was created by Nobel Laureate (in economics) and mathematician John Nash. Nash
contributed several key concepts to game theory around 1950. Id. See also ANDREw GAVIL
ET AL, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION

POLICY, at 241-42 (2002). See Bruce Schneier, Doping in Professional Sports, Schneier.
com (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/doping-in-profe.html.
The doping arms race will continue because of the incentives. It's a classic Prisoner's
Dilemma.
Consider two competing athletes: Alice and Bob. Both Alice and Bob have to individually decide if they are going to take drugs or not. Imagine Alice evaluating her
two options:
"If Bob doesn't take any drugs," she thinks, "then it will be in my best interest to take
them. They will give me a performance edge against Bob. I have a better chance of
winning."
"Similarly, if Bob takes drugs, it's also in my interest to agree to take them. At least
that way Bob won't have an advantage over me."
"So even though I have no control over what Bob chooses to do, taking drugs gives
me the better outcome, regardless of what his action."
Unfortunately, Bob goes through exactly the same analysis. As a result, they both take
performance-enhancing drugs and neither has the advantage over the other. If they
could just trust each other, they could refrain from taking the drugs and maintain
the same non-advantage status-without any legal or physical danger. But competing
athletes can't trust each other, and everyone feels he has to dope-and continues to
search out newer and more undetectable drugs-in order to compete. And the arms
race continues.
Id.
119 GAVIL,
120

supra note 129, at 241-42.

Id.
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C. Market Analysis
In the case of the market, the relevant actors involved would be the producers, sellers, and consumers of ephedrine products. The actors who will benefit
from this legal change would be the consumers. The problem with the consumer
is that there are many diffused actors who may or may not want to take action to
precipitate change.' 2
The costs associated with the production of ephedrine include the costs of
advertising since producers advertise to create a market.' 22 As long as the costs
of advertising create sales and profits, the benefits to the producers and sellers
will obviously outweigh the costs. This advertising could create a bias among
consumers. 2 3 The advertising for ephedrine products depicts it as a weight loss
wonder and not as a high risk supplement.'24 Thus, advertising may lead consumers within the market to think that the product is a safe, weight-loss drug; without
emphasizing the potential hazards of use. This is a form of minoritaian bias.' 25
The benefit to the consumer, as discussed earlier, is not facing adverse health
risks such as death, heart attack, or stroke. 2 6 Even though the benefit of possible
weight loss seems to pale in comparison to possible death, the misinformation
distributed by the ephedrine producers creates a failure in the market.
Skewed market perception due to advertising to a diffused consumer base
has prevented the market from making progress in eliminating this substance.
Although the stakes that the consumer has may be high, and the benefits may
also be high, the consumer may not be aware of the potential for harm due to the
advertising practices of ephedrine producers. In this situation, initially the market
seems like an efficient, cost effective institution to facilitate the implementation
of public policy because if consumers become aware of the risks involved in use,
it would be in their best interest to stop using the product. Thus, the product
'2'
122

Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577. See aho KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 105.
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Releases Report on Weight-Loss

Advertising (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/weightlossrpt.
htm. Id. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has published a forty-eight-page staff report
on current trends in weight-loss advertising. Id. FTC releases report on weight-loss advertising. FTC news release, Sept 17, 2002. Id. The report noted that nearly 40 percent of
the ads made at least one representation that is almost certainly false and 55 percent made
at least one representation that is very likely to be false. Id.
123 KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 100-105.
124 METABOLIFE, Me Looking Pretty (July 1, 2006), availableat Metabolife.com (2005). An
advertisement for Metabolife, an ephedrine product, claimed it was "[a] breakthrough
appetite suppressant, Metabolife Ultra is formulated for sustained energy, Metabolife
Ultra helps you stay on track so you can meet your weight-loss goals." Id.
125
26

1

See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 115-16.

NFL GeneralCounselAdolpho Birch Speaks on the NFL's DrugPolicy, 5 VAND. J.

ENT.

L.

& PRAc. 6 (Winter 2002).
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no longer produces profits for the producers and is no longer a viable product.
However, because of advertising affecting the dissemination of information
concerning the health risks involved with use, the market may not have optimal
ability to facilitate public policy change on a large scale. In fact the market did not
facilitate any change in the production of ephedrine products.
D. PoliticalProcess Analysis
Taking the same institutional choice analytical framework and applying it to
the political process, an evaluator would find that that the actors in this case study
would be legislators; lobbyists for the sports supplement industry, consumers,
and voters. Assuming that the public policy goal is consumer safety, the evaluator
would next need to examine the costs of information, efficiency in the decision
making process, the stakes each actor has in the decision, and possible skewed
reasoning resulting from a minoritarian bias, if it is not countered with a majori12 7
tarian bias.
The cost of information, the amount of time and energy it would take to
understand the information, considering it is of a technical nature, and the number of legislators involved who would need to be informed before they could make
an educated decision, would result in a very high cost of information.' 28 Similarly,
the amount of time it would take to inform and draft a bill affecting public policy
was in reality also not efficient. 2 9 The legislature and FDA worked to ban the
substance for several years before having success.
The actors with the highest stakes in the decision are the lobbyists who work
for the producers and are therefore dependent on the continued sales of ephedrine
for their livelihood, the legislators who need to answer to the voters for the decisions that are made, and the consumer who is at risk for using the product. 3 °
Skewed information is again where this process, like the market process has the
potential to break down.'13 If the consumers are unaware of the potential for
adverse health risks, and do not make their elected officials aware of the desire
for social policy change, then the legislators may not have an accurate portrayal
of public sentiment. Similarly, the lobbyists who are highly paid to influence
decision-makers, may be in the minority against public sentiment, but as the old
saying goes "the squeaky wheel gets the grease."

127

See

128

Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577. See also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 105-15.

KOMESAR,

supra note 32, at 53-97.

See generally Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 E Supp. 2d 1310 (D.Utah 2005).
The FDA invested 3 years in drafting and defending their final rule from the ephedrine
producer's attacks just to have the rule overturned by the courts. Id.
130 See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 125-28 (referring to the roles and stakes within the
political system). See a/so Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577.
131See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 53-97.
129
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To illustrate how public sentiment and the goals of the lobbyists for the sports
supplement industry are at odds, the following three example of public sentiment
are included. The University of California-Berkeley Wellness Letter recently made
this statement:
In 1994 federal legislation-the Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act, passed after intensive lobbying by the
supplements industry-essentially removed so-called "dietary
supplements" from FDA control. Manufacturers can now suggest almost anything on their packages and in ads, without any
proof of safety or efficacy, but in theory at least, cannot make
medical claims. Flawed studies are vigorously cited in support
of dubious or even dangerous products. Studies that show a
negative effect are never mentioned, and indeed may never be
published.' 32
At the recent International Symposium of Supplements in Sports held in Montreal,
Canada, the official conclusion was that:
The use of nutritional supplements in sport is a matter of great
concern. It represents a significant doping risk with all too
often devastating consequences for athletes. In addition to the
possibility of inadvertent doping from the consumption of a
contaminated or mislabelled [sic] supplement, athletes face
133
problems including risks to health and safety.
The NCAA also informed its student athletes that "[d]ietary supplements are not
strictly regulated and may contain substances banned by the NCAA. What's in
the bottle is not always on the label. If you don't know what you're taking, you are
risking both your health and your eligibility." 34
The skewed perception created by lobbyists creates a minoritarian bias that
may greatly influence the decision of governmental actors.1 35 If the diffused consumer/voter base does not organize, there is a substantial chance that legislators
will not make the decision that the majority of stakeholders actually desire. The
cost of creating a majoritarian bias with a diffused stakeholder base is very high
36
due to the number of people and amount of energy it would take to organize.1
If the minoritarian view prevails, voters have the option to vote for new policy
Rick Collins, InsidersUpdate on the Regulatory Issues SurroundingSports Supplements,
Anabolic-Pharma.com (June 18, 2004), available at http://www.mesomorphosis.com/
articles/collins/sports-supplements.htm.
132

133 Id.

Id.
135See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 53-97.
134

136 See id.
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makers, but then the process would need to begin all over again and time and
resources would have been wasted.
The one positive for the political process in this case study is that their decision could be far-reaching and legally binding. The rest of the evaluation shows
that it is an inefficient institution to make this decision, the costs are extremely
high, and there is a greater chance of minoritarian bias offsetting the majority
goal. In sum, the political process does not seem like the best choice of institution
to achieve the desired social policy goal of consumer safety and in this case study,
this institution failed to facilitate any change in policy for quite some time.
Komesar's theory seems to have predicted the behavior of the political process
quite accurately. To contrast the NFL action concerning ephedrine with the federal
government's actions concerning the same substance, the NFL took initial action
1
in December 2000 to inform players of the dangers of ephedrine products. 37
Within two months of Stringer's death, the league and player's association were
able to agree to ban all ephedrine products. 38 Although this may seem too late,
and the government may argue that if the NFL had banned the substance earlier
Stringer may still be alive, the FDA was not able to ban ephedrine products for
over three years.' 39 One year and one day after the FDA implemented its final rule
banning the sale of all ephedrine dietary supplements, a United States District
Court determined that the final rule was invalid. 4 Finally, on August 17, 2006,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Denver upheld the
FDA's final rule declaring all dietary supplements containing ephedrine illegal
for marketing in the United States, reversing a decision by the District Court of
Utah."" Subsequently on August 21, 2006, the FDA in a press release stated in
no uncertain terms, "[n]o dosage of dietary supplements containing ephedrine
alkaloids is safe and the sale of these products in the United States is illegal and
subject to FDA enforcement action."' 4 2 Clearly, the political process has worked
for the policy at issue, but it is also clearly not the most efficient institution to
facilitate the desired change. As Sidney Wolfe, M.D., Director of Public Citizen's
Health Research Group stated,
All the scientific evidence and legal authority to ban ephedrawas
in place at the time of our petition, which we filed in September
2001. One reason major manufacturers have stopped selling
See Birch interview, supra note 126 at 8.
Id.
139 Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 E Supp. 2d 1310 (D.Utah 2005).
140Id.
1 Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006).
142 Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Statement on Tenth Circuit's
Ruling to Uphold FDA Decision Banning Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine
Alkaloids (Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/
NEW01434.html.
137
138
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ephedra is that the companies have become uninsurable because
of massive losses in product liability cases. When we filed our
petition, there were reports of 81 ephedra-related deaths. Now
4
... that number has nearly doubled. '
With that number of fatalities, the ultimate success of the FDA ban cannot be
called a success.

E. JudiciaryAnalysis
The central purpose of the participation-centered approach is that legal
change will not take place without interested parties acting to generate the desired
change. 144 This is no more evident than in the court system. The actors in this case
are the litigants; a supplement company that manufactures ephedrine products
and the FDA. Other relevant actors include the judge, the lawyers who represented the litigants, and other court employees.
The interests of the relevant actors are varied. The supplement producer in
this case was forced to bring an action against the FDA in order to continue to
produce and sell ephedrine products. 145 The FDA's interest is in preventing the
adverse affects that ephedrine products can inflict on the consumer. Federal judges
are appointed for life and generally cannot be swayed by opinion, but rather by
how the law applies to the facts in a given circumstance. 146 Finally, lawyers are
interested in representing their clients interests.
Institutions create their own costs that affect whether they will take account
of all interests. The adjudicative process, with its formal rules and its limited scale,
likely poses the highest cost to participation for a diffusely spread interest. 4 7 The
structure and evenhandedness that the courts possess come at a cost.' 48 The interested parties must take action in order to affect change because the courts cannot
create social change without interested parties bringing suit. The costs of litigation
are generally assumed to be very high. 149 These costs not only includes lawyers,
but also expert witnesses, researchers, writers, and the time it takes the litigants
away from their own profession which limits their earning potential. 50 What
Mark Moran, Did Delay ofEphedra Ban Cause Unnecessary Deaths?, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS
(Feb. 6, 2004), availableat http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/39/3/24.
144 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 556.
14"Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 E Supp. 2d 1310-12 (2005).
146 Justice Thurgood Marshall, Address at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (May 8,
1981), (transcript availableathttp://www.thurgoodmarshall.comspeeches/swordarticle.
htm).
147 See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 123-25.
148 Id.
149 Id.
143

150

See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 127.
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the courts do potentially offer is a lack of minority bias which, as demonstrated,
is present in the political process through lobbyists, and in the market through
advertising. However, if one set of stakeholders is the diffused consumer base, and
the other is a wealthy corporation and the costs of organization for the diffused
party may be cost prohibitive. Additionally, the opportunity for the corporation
to hire legal counsel and possibly drag out litigation long enough to bankrupt
its less organized and diffused opponent is present. The courts' approach to the
ephedrine issue was illustrated in Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford.15'
In Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, Nutraceutical sued the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) claiming that the FDA's application of the final rule as
applied to ephedrine federal law.152 Plaintiffs, ephedrine-alkaloid dietary supplements (EDS) manufacturers sued Defendants, the Commissioner of the United
States FDA and other officials, challenging the validity of the FDA's regulation
which banned all EDS. They claim the rule was in violation of the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA). 15 3 After extensive review,
the FDA concluded that all EDS, regardless of the dose suggested in labeling,
presented an unreasonable risk of illness or injury, and banned the distribution
of all such products on the basis that they were adulterated within the meaning
of the DSHEA. 154 The court determined that the FDA's imposition of a riskbenefit analysis placed a burden on the producers of EDS to demonstrate a benefit
as a precondition to sale, which was contrary to Congress' intent. 5 5 Congress
unequivocally stated that the United States had to bear the burden of proof on
each element to show that a dietary supplement was adulterated.' 56 Thus, the
FDAs requirement that the manufacturers demonstrate a benefit was contrary
to the clear intent of Congress. 157 For those same reasons, the FDA's definition
of "unreasonable", which entailed a risk-benefit analysis, was also improper.'58
Additionally, there was insufficient evidence in the administrative record to
establish that the risks identified by the FDA were associated with the intake
of low-dose EDS.'59 The statement by the FDA that a safe level of ephedrine
could not be determined, was simply not sufficient to meet the Government's
6
burden. 1
151Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D.Utah 2005).
15 2 Id. at 1321. Safety of dietary supplements and burden of proof on FDA; the

FDA concluded that when the minimal benefits of ephedrine are weighed against the substantial
risks, ephedrine presents an unreasonable risk of illness under ordinary conditions of use.
Id. See also 69 FR 6788-01.
153 Nutraceutical,364 E Supp. 2d at 1319.
151 Id. at 1312.
155 Id. at 1318-19.
111 Id. at 1319.
157 Id.
158 Id.
59
' Id at 1321.
160

Id.
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Being bound by precedent, statutory construction, and legislative intent,
the court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and
stated that, "[t]he statute reads that the government's burden is met only if it has
demonstrated the presence of a risk under the conditions of use recommended or
suggested in labeling."' 6 The court also noted that the plain language of the statute requires a dose specific analysis. 162 Legislative history also confirms Congress'
1 63
"intent to require ... that the finding be dose-specific."
Finally, as stated in the previous section, in August 2006, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Denver upheld the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) final rule, declaring all dietary supplements containing
ephedrine alkaloids adulterated, and therefore illegal for marketing in the United
States, reversing a decision by the District Court of Utah. 64 The FDA explained
the decision in the following press release excerpt:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling demonstrates the
soundness of FDA's decision to ban dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids, consistent with the Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act (DSHEA) of 1994. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals also found that Congress clearly required FDA
to conduct a risk-benefit analysis under DSHEA.
FDA conducted an exhaustive and highly resource-intensive
evaluation of the relevant scientific data evidence on ephedrine
alkaloids before issuing its final rule, which became effective in
2004. The court found that the 133,000-page administrative
record compiled by FDA supports the agency's findings that
dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids pose an
unreasonable risk of illness or injury to users, especially those
165
suffering from heart disease and high blood pressure.
The inherent problem when the court considers public policy, is the institution's inability to change anything but the issue before the courts, and that decision may not best serve public policy. The Utah court clearly did not affect change
in the social policy of consumer safety in this instance. Although the decision was
efficient and far-reaching, the underlying goal was not achieved. Finally, the court
of appeals did effect the appropriate change by upholding the ephedrine ban,
166
however, several more ephedrine related deaths occurred during the interim.
also 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A)(1) (2005).
Id. at 1320 (interpreting the language of 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A)(1) (2005)).
163 Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 E Supp. 2d 1310, 1319-20 (D.Utah 2005).
'6(Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 E3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006).
165 FDA Press Release, supra note 142.
161 Id. See
162

166

Moran, supra note 143.
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Finally, Nutraceutical can still appeal this decision to the Supreme Court and have
it overturned again, negating the tenth circuit decision. This case study shows
that the courts are high cost because of the time and man hours associated with
litigation, and achieving the desired policy implementation through the court
is difficult. The courts are not likely to be the best choice of institutions for the
purposes of this goal of implementing the policy of consumer safety.
E Conclusions of Study
The overall outcome of the case study demonstrates that even though these
institutions were all able to facilitate the desired policy change and protect the
public from the adverse affects of ephedrine, the political process and the courts
had far-reaching and permanent implications while operating inefficiently. The
market facilitated almost no change. The NFL facilitated an efficient change that
did not affect the general public. It could be argued that the NFus actions and
subsequent press releases concerning ephedrine may have prompted the governmental action and subsequent court cases, and then those institutions facilitated
the desired public policy change. The purpose of this case study was to test the
theory and demonstrate how the institutions acted in real life. By changing the
assumed policy goal from consumer safety to the elimination of ephedrine in
sports, it can be seen that the NFL would be the most efficient institution in
facilitating that goal.
Now that the framework has been applied to a situation that involves the
same institutions and actors, utilizing a very similar policy goal, we can apply
the framework to the question of who decides drug testing policy for the NFL.
The actors in each institution will be the same. Because the ephedrine case study
demonstrated how these actors reacted to the job of implementing policy, it is
assumed that the institutions will react in a similar manner given a similar public
policy to implement. Therefore, the next section bases its conclusions on the
actual actions taken by each institution in the ephedrine case study.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUG POLICY

The NFL has dealt with the problem of performance enhancing drugs for
more than twenty years. 167 Over time the league has developed a program of testing and deterrence that is commonly regarded as the "most comprehensive in
professional sports today."' 168 Since the congressional hearings and the grand jury
investigations in the BALCO scandal erupted, Congress has expressed its opinion,
that as an institution, it is better able to determine how best to deter professional and student athletes from using steroids and other performance enhancing
167

Tagliabue, supra note 113.
Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th

168Steroid

Cong. (2005) (testimony of Gene Upshaw, President of the NFL Players Association).
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drugs. 69 This next section begins by reviewing the current NFL performance
enhancing drug testing policy. Then it will illustrate the history of each institution
in regards to drug testing programs, how the decisions have been made in the
past, and how using the institutional choice framework will predict the institution
best able to make the decision to achieve the desired policy in the future.
A. History of the NFL's PerformanceEnhancingDrug Testing Program
The NFL began testing for steroids in 1987.170 The Policy and Program
on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances began suspensions for violators in
1989, and in 1990 instituted a year-round random testing program including
off-season testing that is backed by suspensions without pay for violations.' 7' The
program also has strong features to deter evasion including suspension for players
testing positive for masking agents. 172 Players who test positive are subject to up
to 24 unannounced tests per year, including off-season testing. 173 They will also
be subject to frequent, year-round testing for the remainder of their professional
football careers. 174
The NFL policy apparently does have its flaws, as pointed out by Rep. Elijah
Cummings (D-MD). 175 In the April 27, 2005, Hearing of the House Government
Reform Committee he stated,
In the past five years, only 0.5% of the 15,000 NFL players have
tested positive. However, while the NFL's drug testing policy is
strong, it needs to be one of zero tolerance and it needs to be
airtight. [The] NFI:s policy fails to meet the Olympic standard
in several key areas, from insufficiently prohibiting the testing
[of] stimulants to inadequately penalizing players who test
positive. Allegations that the NFL steroid testing policy may be
underestimating the scope of the problem must be considered
in light of a recent 60 Minutes report that . . . three Carolina
Panthers obtained steroids before the 2004 Super Bowl and
76
evaded detection. 1

169

Id.

170

Birch interview, supra note 126, at 6.

171Id.

Id. A masking agent is a substance that covers or "masks" a performance enhancing
drug present in the body. It is used to avoid detection of the performance enhancing drug
in a test sample. Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
'75 Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005).
172

176 Id.
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There are many obstacles that need to be addressed by both labor and management. Besides, the basic issues raised by drug testing, like test reliability, and
privacy rights of players, there is also the potential conflict between employer and
employee rights under federal labor laws. The following will discuss the current
program bargained for by the NFL and the NFLPA.
Paul Tagliabue, former Commissioner of the NFL, addressed the steroid issue
in an appearance in Washington to testify before Congress. Although Tagliabue
commended the congressional involvement, he also stated that he does not believe
that there is rampant cheating in professional football.1 77 Tagliabue also released
a statement to NFL.com outlining the goals of the program as well as an outline
as to what the current parameters are. Tagliabue's statement outlining the current
policy stated that the program consists of:
(1) An annual test for all players plus unannounced random
testing in and out of season. We test players on all teams
each week of the season, conducting more than 8,000 tests
per year for steroids and related substances.
(2) A list of more than 70 prohibited substances, including
anabolic steroids, steroid precursors, growth hormone,
stimulants, and masking agents. This list is revised and
expanded on an ongoing basis.
(3) A mandatory four-game suspension (25 percent of the season) without pay upon a first violation. A second violation
would result in a six-game suspension and a third would ban
a player for a minimum of one year. Players cannot return to
the field until they test clean and are cleared for play.
(4) Strict liability for players who test positive. Violations are not
excused because a player says he was unaware that a product
contained a banned substance.
(5) Education of players and teams about the program through
literature, videos, a toll-free hotline, and mandatory meet-

ings.

178

179
As Representative Cummings noted, there are very few positive tests in the NFL.
The league maintains its research and testing facilities at the UCLA Olympic

177 Associated Press, NFL Against Uniform Drug Tests, NFL.com (April 27, 2005), available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/8423675.
178 Tagliabue, supra note 113.
179 Id.
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Analytical Laboratory in Los Angeles, which is the same institution responsible
for upholding the Olympic standard of which Cummings spoke. 8 °
As an example of how the NFL's policy can adapt, Tagliabue stated that as soon
as the lab informed them of the designer steroid THG, it was banned and a test
was developed and implemented into the current program seamlessly.'8 1 Tagliabue
pointed out in his statement, and later to Congress, that through the collective
bargaining process, the NFL addressed the issue of performance enhancing drugs
over a decade and $100 million ago.' 82
B. NFL Analysis
In order to consider institutional choice in depth, the analyst must simplify
the public policy goal discussion and assume the goal rather than providing
detailed proof' 83 In this case, Congress has stated that the high visibility of the
steroid problem in professional sports has caused a marked increase in performance enhancing drug use by high school students. 8 4 Adolpho Birch, Counsel
for Labor Relations for the National Football League, stated that the performance
enhancing drug testing program was created to attain three main goals,
...the first goal is to ensure the competitive integrity of the
game; the second goal is to prevent the adverse health effects
related to use of those types of substances; and the third would
be to protect the league in terms of its role model obligations
with respect to the youth who are particularly vulnerable to
18 5
things that they see NFL players doing.
Based on these statements, the analyst could assume that the underlying public
policy goal is to eliminate the use of performance enhancing drugs at all levels of
athletic competition for the purpose of public safety.

'80 Id. See also Steroid Use in Sports Hearing on H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't Reform
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005).
181See Tagliabue, supra note 113 (citing that the UCLA lab informed the league in 2002
of the new designer steroid called THG. The league immediately added it to the banned
substance list and started officially testing for it on a uniform basis on October 6, 2003.
Since then, the league has randomly tested more than 3,000 player urine samples and
there have been no THG positives).
182

Id.

Freiwald, supra note 58, at 597.
184Steroid Use in Sports, Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't Reform Comm., 109th
183

Cong. (2005).
185Birch interview, supra note 126, at 6.
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As in the ephedrine study, the relevant actors are the NFLPA, the NFL
Management Council, and the players. 8 6 The evaluator must also look at the
NFL not only as solitary institution, but also as a market force within football as
18 7
a whole.
The information that is applicable to making this decision is already available
to the actors in this situation due to the nature of the collectively bargained for
policy currently in place. 88 Although the cost of gathering this information is well
over the $100 million range, it would generally be the same information that any
other institution planning on making the same decision would need to acquire
and utilize at its own expense. 8 9 This cost has been accumulating over a considerable period of time for the NFL. The cost of inflation and time pressure to analyze
the technical data could potentially be more expensive for other institutions that
are not well-versed in performance enhancing drugs. The aggregate transactions
that have led to this accumulation of costs over time have also influenced the current testing model used by the NFL, and while not perfect, it is the contention of
the NFL and the NFLPA that the process is constantly evolving and changing.' 90
Since the program is a product of transactions, it is flexible enough that it can
change as conditions dictate more readily than a prescribed program from outside
the league. This mirrors the actual outcome that was illustrated in the ephedrine
case study.' 91 The NFL in both situations has already assessed the costs of their
program and can ban a substance quickly and effectively. Thus, the NFL as an
institution can effectively implement an efficient plan to further the public policy
goal of eliminating performance enhancing drugs from professional football.
However, there needs to be further inquiry into whether it can eliminate these
substances in all levels of athletic competition.
C. Market Analysis
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the NFL acts as an institution
in and of itself and it also acts like a market for professional athletes. The next part
of this analysis will draw on the fact that the NFL is the market for professional
football players and as such, has the capacity to determine the behaviors of the
athletes it seeks to employ.

discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part IVC.

186 See
187

Johnson-Bateman Co. 295 NLRB 180, 187 (1989) (holding that the National Labor
Relations Board under the National Labor Relations Act, has already ruled that drug
testing is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.).
189 See Tagliabue, supra note 113.
190 Birch interview, supra note 126, at 8.
191See discussion supra Part III. B.
188
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The actors in the market are the same as the NFL since the NFL is the market for professional football players. Therefore, the actions of the players, the
NFL Management Council, need to be examined, as well as the producers and
consumers of performance enhancing drugs. The consumers within the world of
professional football are football players who aspire to play in the NFL, and the
producers of performance enhancing drugs. The consumers/athletes are affected
because the market for professional athletes (NFL) denies the ability of consumers
of performance enhancing drugs (consumers/athletes) to have an opportunity to
play at the elite level.
The costs and benefits to the players are balanced between having the speed
and strength to play at the elite level and whether or not to use performance
enhancing drugs to achieve that goal. There is a possibility that the consumers/athletes who have aspirations to play football professionally, may stop their
use of the banned substances during their amateur career in order to play for the
NFL. The NFPLA and the Management Council have agreed that performance
enhancing drugs do not belong in pro football. If the players improve their skills
through these substances there is a substantial likelihood they will be caught and
prevented from competing at the highest level of play.1 92 Therefore it would be in
the best interest of the player who aspires to play professionally not to use performance enhancing drugs. This does further the public policy goal of eliminating
performance enhancing drugs from all levels of athletic competition.
There is of course the influence of producers of these drugs on the players. Producers like Conte and BALCO allegedly convinced several high profile
professionals to use substances that could not be detected. Though the majority
of banned substances are also illegal, some are not. Therefore advertising can be
tricky. In Conte's case, he advertised a service. That service included the use of
performance enhancing drugs. Some substances which are banned by the league
can be advertised as supplements.1 93 Other substances, like anabolic steroids,
could be endorsed through high profile athletes, as Jose Canseco claimed.1 94 The
league does not allow NFL players to publicly endorse any banned substance or
companies that produce any known banned substance.' 95
The ultimate choice to use these products belongs to the player. Therefore,
the bias that could affect the players comes from the league's collective bargaining
agreement in the form of limits on participation based banned substance use,
and through the advertising of these same substances. As the ephedrine study

192See supra text accompanying note 118.
193 See supra text
194

accompanying notes 133, 135.

See generally CANSECO, supra note 1.

195 Associated Press, Hasselbeck Embraces Supplements Endorsement, July 28, 2006, avail-

able at http://www.nfl.com/teams/story/SEAI957623 1.
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illustrated, the NFLPA, as representatives for the players, made it clear that performance enhancing substances that adversely affect a player's health should not
be part of the game.96
Due to the fact that the NFL does not allow performance enhancing drugs
as an institution, and the NFL is the most influential market force in professional
football, the league would be able to efficiently implement a performance enhancing drug testing program for its current players as it creates a market force that helps
eliminate these drugs in all levels of the game. The NFL demonstrated, through
development of its performance enhancing drug program and the ephedrine case
study, it is able to make efficient, cost effective, decisions in regards to drug testing
policy for the desired public policy goal of eliminating performance-enhancing
drugs from all levels of competition. This makes the NFL, and more accurately, all
professional sports leagues unique. The leagues have a tremendous market share
of the professional sport, and are also in position to set policy for that market.
The caveat is that since all sports do not have similar testing regimens, the data is
inconclusive in regards to how the all the professional sports leagues, as markets
for professional athletes, would be able to handle elimination of performance
enhancing drugs in all sports.
D. PoliticalProcessAnalysis-The DrugFree Sports Act
Taking the same analytical framework and applying it to the political process,
an evaluator would find that that the actors in this case study would be legislators,
lobbyists for the sports leagues, and the voters.' 97 Assuming that the public policy
goal is the elimination of performance enhancing drugs from all levels of athletic
competition, the evaluator would next need to examine the costs of information,
efficiency in the decision making process, the stakes each actor has in the decision, and possible skewed reasoning resulting from a minoritarian bias, if it is not
countered with a majoritarian bias.' 98
The cost of information, the amount of time and energy it would take to
understand the information, considering it is of a technical nature, and the number of legislators involved who would need to be informed before they could make
an educated decision, would result in a very high cost of information.' 9 9 Similarly,
the amount of time it would take to inform and draft a bill affecting public
policy would also not be efficient. The bill that Congress introduced on April
26, 2005, is being called the Drug Free Sports Act. 2° ° The bill explains generally
196 See discussion supra Part III.B.
197 This article will concentrate on the NFL, although it should be noted that all leagues
with collective bargaining agreements would be a consolidated high stakes actor in this

process.
198 See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 53-97.
'99

Freiwald, supra note 58, at 576.

200

Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 1862, 109th Cong. (2005).
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that the list of banned substances will be determined by the World Anti-Doping
Agency [WADA], and the program would be administered by the Secretary of
Commerce.' It also contains a very strict suspension provision that states:
(A) Suspension.
(i) An athlete who tests positive shall be suspended from participation in the professional sports association for a minimum
of 2 years.
(ii) An athlete who tests positive, having once previously tested
positive shall be permanently suspended from participation
20 2
in the professional sports association.
This universally adaptable program was created to further the public policy
goal of eliminating performance enhancing drugs from all levels of athletic competition.20 3 This bill, if voted into law, would likely be able to achieve the desired
public policy goal, but at what cost? Since this framework is based on economic
theory, the costs to the applicable actors in the political process, as well as the
20 4
benefits, must be considered in determining their actions.
The lobbyists for the NFL, and for that matter, lobbyists for the entirety of
professional sports and the leagues they represent, have a high stake in how the
public policy goal is implemented. The implementation decision, if not favorable to the leagues, would drastically reduce the amount of control that they
have enjoyed in policing their own rules. It would also diminish the amount of
capital already invested over the last twenty years by the NFL. All the research and
development that the NFL has invested in their program would be assimilated
by the federal government's new plan of discipline for professional athletes. The
leagues are a consolidated high stakes actor in this process and will expend their
legal resources to prevent government control of their market. To date, the NFL
has appeared before Congress and has offered legal documents in support of its
position.20 5
Since the policy of keeping performance enhancing drugs out of all levels of
athletic competition affects public safety, voters with children who are involved in
athletic competition, have a high stake in the outcome of the decision. The voters
are a diffused group with high stakes, so according to Komesar's participation201
202

Id., 3(2).
Id., § 3(A)(iii).

Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005).
204 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 577. See also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 105-15.
205 Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th
203

Cong. (2005) (testimony of Paul Tagliabue).
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centered approach, it would be very costly to organize this group into any kind of
politically effective organization. 0 6 It would also cost money to be represented in
the decision-making process for any interested party through lobbyist groups. A
problem also arises when the information that concerns the general public is of a
technical nature.2 0 7 The diffused power base of voters may not be aware that drug
testing at the professional level could have an impact on their children's health and
may not agree that changing policy at the professional level will in fact lead to the
awareness that the policy goal is aimed to achieve.
As in the ephedrine case study, the time and costs associated with governmental
intervention will not likely be efficient.20 8 Political action may end up costing the
taxpayers millions of dollars to administer a program that was previously financed
privately by the leagues. Accordingly, the voters would be reluctant to finance this
program. If the Drug Free Sports Act becomes law without the voters backing,
the only recourse voters have is to vote for different representation. Unfortunately,
there is no guarantee that the issue will be properly addressed by the new representation. This wastes time and resources. This is inefficient and mirrors the
209
political process' shortcomings illustrated by the ephedrine case study.
Assuming that actors will act in their best interest, it would seem that the
legislators would only try to address this issue if they believe that the majority
of their constituents would like them to do so. Assuming the majority of voters polled approve of government action, it becomes the legislator's job to hear
the majority and the minority views. The majority of voters may not have the
resources to properly be heard by the legislators and that may lead to a minoritarian dominant view. In this particular case, it would seem that the cost of this
proposed legislation would be high since the research is of a technical nature and
specific to the sports industry. The scientific research required to administer the
program outlined in the Drug Free Sports Act would require consistent review
by performance enhancing drug testing experts in order to make sure that new
designer steroids like THG do not impede the integrity of the program. z0 As
denoted in H.R. 1862 § 3, the proposed program would be officially managed by
211
the federal government.

206

KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 69.

Freiwald, supra note 58, at 556-77.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
209 See discussion supra Part III.D.
210 See Tagliabue, supra note 113.
211 Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 1862, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (stating that the Secretary
shall, by rule, issue a list of substances for which each athlete shall be tested. Such substances
shall be those that are determined by the World Anti-Doping Agency to be prohibited
substances; and determined by the Secretary to be performance-enhancing substances for
which testing is reasonable and practicable).
207
208
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So who pays for this program? The NFL has claimed they have invested over
$100 million over the past twenty years in performance enhancing drug testing
programs and it could be assumed that through a proper economic analysis, this
number would be quite a bit higher for the next twenty years. 212 The legislation does not indicate who will pay for this proposed program, its organization,
research, or management. It is likely that the government would need to finance
the program's research as well as a staff to administer the outlined program. This
government expenditure would need to come from somewhere and it is likely
that the taxpayers would bear the brunt. If voters act in their own best interest,
they would not want to financially support this legislation since they would now
have to pay for the costs that the leagues currently pay. If this information is not
clearly understood by the voter base, it is an indication that a misrepresentation in
the polling process occurred because of the difficulty of disseminating the correct
information to a diffused majority stakeholder power base. If this becomes the
case, the polling process and the cost to obtain information become inefficient.
The sports leagues and the NFL in particular, have a high stake in the decision
and the financing to influence decision makers. In evaluating the political process,
an evaluator can determine the political process has a far reaching result that will
likely be inefficient, costly, and not in the best interest of the public policy goal of
eliminating performance enhancing drugs from all levels of athletic competition
for the purpose of promoting public health. As in the ephedrine case study, and
judging from the current progress of the Drug Free Sports Act, Congress would
2 13
not be the best institution to make this decision.

E. JudiciaryAnalysis
In order for the courts to become an institution that is relevant, there would
need to be a party that tests the law or rule. This can be done through judicial
review or individual player action. An example of the judicial review process can
be found in the ephedrine case study. Nutraceutical Corporation brought a claim
against the FDA for its final rule on ephedrine. 214 The judicial review court found
that the final rule violated agency rulemaking procedure and was consequently
found invalid.215 In individual player actions, a player who has been found to
have violated the new law can challenge the validity after he has exhausted all
of the remedies provided for by statute. In this section this article will examine
relevant case law on the subject of workplace drug testing. Then institutional
212 See Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm.,

109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Paul Tagliabue). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP., Fed.
Highway Admin., Economic Analysis Primer (May 8, 2005), available at http://www.
fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/asstmgmt/primer03.htm. The Consumer Price index (CPI)
is the best known inflation index and an explanation is provided. Id.
213 See discussion supra Part III.D.
214 Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 E Supp. 2d 1310 (D.Utah 2005).
215 Id.
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choice theory will be applied to the relevant decision makers keeping the relevant
case law in mind and drawing conclusions based on the ephedrine case study. This
analysis will determine if the judiciary could implement a program that would
achieve the public policy goal of eliminating performance enhancing drugs from
all levels of athletic competition for public health reasons.
1.

Relevant Drug Testing Case Law

Two of the first Supreme Court cases to test the constitutionality of drug
testing in the workplace were Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Association, and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.216 The decisions for these companion cases were handed down from the Supreme Court on March 21, 1989.217
The court held that railroad employers had limited discretion
under the regulations and there was a strong governmental
interest to regulate railroad employees' conduct to ensure public
safety. The tests were not considered intrusive because there was
a diminished expectation of privacy on the information relating
to the physical condition of covered employees and to reasonable
means of procuring the information because the industry was
highly regulated for safety. The court found that most railroads
218
required periodic physical exams for certain employees.
The testing programs in question were the first that considered random drug testing without any suspicion of use. 21 9 Prior to these two cases, an employer would
220
need to have a reasonable suspicion in order to test an employee for drugs.
The Court upheld the two testing programs because it found that drug testing
comported with the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement. 221 The
majority in both cases decided, "What is reasonable, of course, depends on all of
the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search
or seizure itself. Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
217 ACLU, Legislative Briefing Kit: Drug Testing (Dec. 31, 1998), available at http://aclu.
org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=9078&c= 178. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
218 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602 (1989).
219 See ACLU, supra note 217.
216

220 _[d.
221 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (upholding the reasonable requirement by saying, "[w]hen
the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause, we have usually required some quantum of individualized suspicion before concluding that a search
is reasonable").
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promotion of legitimate governmental interests. "222 The majority went on to hold
that where the government could demonstrate "special needs" it could subject its
22 3
workforce to suspicionless searches, in this case drug tests.
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, "[t]he broad, public safety rational of the
majority could lead to the suspicionless testing of automobile drivers, construction
workers, and school crossing guards. 2 2 4 It seems that Justice Scalia was justified
in his concerns because there has been over a 140 percent increase in private sector drug screening since 1987.225 In the post Skinner/Von Raab decisions, several
trends have evolved. In general, courts are upholding drug-testing programs for
jobs that implicate public safety. 226 These are jobs like motor vehicle operator,
locomotive engineers, and aircraft pilots. 22 7 Secondly, the courts are upholding
testing programs for jobs requiring the carrying of firearms.228 This would include
police officers and prison guards. 229 Finally the courts upheld programs for jobs
2 30
that access highly classified material.
Congress is trying to argue that because athletes are role models for children,
there is an implicit nexus with public safety if athletes are perceived to have used
performance-enhancing drugs. 23i The courts have developed the case law to the
degree that they have balancing tests to determine if the act of drug testing interferers with the constitutionally given right to privacy as well as guides as to what
professions may be tested. In order to continue the analysis, the evaluator must
realize that this case law and the accompanying tests are what will be used by the
courts to verify a challenge to the rule or law.
2. InstitutionalChoiceAnalysis
The central purpose of the participation-centered approach is that legal
change will not occur without interested parties who push for it. 232 The institutional analysis must begin with the parties that are willing to bring suit.2 3 3 In this
222

Id. at 619.

223 Id.

Id.
ACLU, Drug Testing: An Overview (Oct. 21 2002), available at http:llww.aclu.orgl
news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID= 10997&c=79.
22 6
AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 E 2d 503 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
224
225

227
228

Id.
Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 E2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Brown v. City of Detroit,

715 E Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
229 Taylor, 888 E2d at 1198; Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 834-35.
230 Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
231 Steroid Use in Sports: Hearingon H.R. 1862 Before the H.R. Gov't. Reform Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005).
232 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 576.
233 Id. at 557.
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case, that would be the NFL, the NFLPA, the federal government, and individual
athletes who will be affected by the change in policy. The remaining actors are
the lawyers and the officers of the court or the administrative law judge and the
appropriate government agency. As mentioned in the ephedrine case study, the
costs of litigation are very high.2 3 4 This not only includes lawyers fees, but also
expert witnesses, researchers, writers, and the time it takes the litigants away from
their own profession which limits their earning potential.2 35 What the courts do
offer is a lack of minority bias as can be seen in the political process through
lobbyists, and the market through advertising. 236 If courts are selected as the
institution to decide the question, the legal rule may fail to change as needed, or
23 7
it may be decided on the basis of the one case that does go to court.
Assuming that the challenge has a valid legal basis, the costs for the litigants
would be substantial. The benefits however, would also be substantial. One
problem in having the courts decide this policy is that the diffused majority of
consumers who have a stake in the outcome are not given the right to be heard
without high costs to organize and the high costs of attorneys.
The courts may also not be able to reach a decision that is far reaching because
of the facts of the case. Depending on the cause of action, the courts may find that
there is no legal recourse for those wishing to have the law examined. If this is the
case, the courts would be the wrong institution to make the decision.
Although the officers of the court do not have a high stake in the outcome
of the case, they are actors in the process and since they are human beings, they
have the capacity to allow their own biases to be reflected in the decision making
process.238 A federal judge has a lifetime appointment and has no outside pressure
to disavow his own biases.23 9
In applying the institutional choice framework to the question at hand, we
would first need to determine what kinds of challenges are available to potential
litigants. In this case, the litigants would either be the leagues and the unions of
the professional sports leagues and the U.S. government in a claim that would
challenge the constitutionality of the law, or the procedure followed in the creation
of such a rule like in the ephedrine case study. Alternatively, a player who tests
positive may challenge the rule on the basis that the job of professional athlete has
no inherent nexus with public safety.

discussion supra Part III.E. See also KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 123, 227.
See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 123-25.
236 See KOMESAR, supra note 32, at 100-105. See also discussion supra Part III.C.
237 Freiwald, supra note 58, at 578.
238 Jon'a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, Research on Bias in JudicialSentencing, 26 N.M.L. REv.
107, 108 (1996).
239 See Marshall, supra note 146.
234 See
235
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As discussed, the courts are bound to the facts of the case that is brought.
As in the ephedrine case study, the circuit courts could only conclude that the
FDA did not follow correct statutory procedure in the rulemaking, thus the rule
was invalid. 240 This delay caused several more ephedrine related deaths until the
appeals court overturned the lower court's decision. 24' In this case, it is not clear
what the controlling agency would be if any, and if there is a procedural rule that
would need to be followed. If the challenge was based on the implicit nexus with
public safety, it could certainly be argued that professional athletes are role models
and as such have an implicit nexus with public safety if they promote the use of
performance enhancing drugs.
The courts as a decision making institution, for the purpose of deciding how
to implement the public policy goal of eliminating performance enhancing drugs
from all levels of athletic competition for public health reasons, would be costly
and inefficient. The majority of affected consumers and voters can not bring a suit
with out the high costs of litigation. The litigation is costly, and if the case needs
to be appealed, it could take years before a final decision is made. The decision
may, after all of this, be limited to the facts of the case.
V. CONCLUSION

So here we are in 2006 estranged from the dreams of a level playing field and
integrity in sport. Where do we go from here? Do I explain to my children that I
was able to watch Barry Bonds in person the year he broke the record? Or do I tell
them that I was witness to one of the greatest shams ever pulled on the American
people? After all, sport is not only an American obsession, but it also encompasses
how we define ourselves and how we play the game of life. "Don't stop playing
till the whistle blows . . . fight for the extra yard . . . play by the rules . . . second
place is the first to lose ... it ain't over till its over ....
These euphemisms are
our culture. In a country that is made up of several diverse and unique cultures,
we can all relate to sports. Just ask. Now we need to put some ice on this black eye
that we collectively share. Who should apply the ice? The NFL as an institution
is the best alternative for deciding how to implement public policy with a goal of
eliminating performance-enhancing drugs from all levels of athletic competition
for the purpose of public health. This has been demonstrated through the application of institutional choice theory to potential decision making institutions and
previous actions of these institutions under similar circumstances. As discussed,
the NFL has already made the considerable investment in research and technology and due to the language of the collective bargaining agreement is capable of
adapting to new drugs in a quick and decisive manner, as the ephedrine case study

240

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1321 (D.Utah 2005).
Moran, supra note 143. See also discussion supra Part III.D-III.E.
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demonstrated.242 Through the Drug Free Sports Act, the federal government is
trying to decide policy for the market which in turn will promote policy for the
nation as a whole. This is inefficient and the cost to the public should be prohibitive. The legislation, although instant and far-reaching, may not have an effect
on the policy goal it is trying to achieve because of its inefficiency in digesting
technical information and inherent delays due to biases. Although it is in the
public interest to require performance-enhancing drug testing for all professional
athletes, Congress is not the best alternative in deciding how this policy is to be
instituted.

242 NATIONAL

FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS

Assoc.,

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, Art. XLIV
6(b) (2006), available at http://nflpa.org/CBA/CBAComplete.aspx.

BETWEENTHE

Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances-The League's existing
Policy and Procedure with respect to Anabolic Steroids and Related
Substances will remain in effect, except as it may be modified in the
future due to scientific advances with respect to testing techniques or
other matters. The parties will establish a joint Advisory Committee,
consisting of the League's Advisor for Anabolic Steroids and Related
Substances and an equal number of members appointed by the NFLPA
and by the Management Council, to study pertinent scientific and
medical issues and to advise the parties on such matters.
Id. See also discussion supra Part IVB.
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